I said: ‘100% oxygen posed an unacceptable risk. NO - you have to look deeper. If a fire had occurred in space and the astronauts were in their suits, the immediate action would have been to depressurize the cabin. Remove the oxygen and they fire goes out.’
Jarrah said in the comments section: Already debunked in my video. It takes as long as half an hour to depressurise the Lunar Module, depressurising the CSM will obviously take longer. That hardly justifies the fire hazard.
I'll post this one here rather than response in the comments section, as it is an important point.
You're wrong, Jarrah, but in one respect you are right. The time taken is far less than that, but it wouldn't have been enough to save them. Prior to the accident, that was the plan - dump the cabin pressure, remove the oxygen and therefore put out the fire. As part of the fire investigation, they studied the effect of a cabin pressure dump. They found a few things:
1. If the Apollo 1 crew had dumped the cabin pressure, it would not have saved them. It would have delayed the pressure hull rupture by a second or two.
2. The time to dump the cabin pressure from about 5 PSI to 0.5 PSI could take from 1 minute 45 seconds to 3 minutes 20 seconds, depending upon the flight phase ambient temperature. NOT in excess of 30 minutes as Jarrah mistaken believes. (Page D-20-9, Report of the Apollo 204 Review Board)
3. The depressurization time was too slow to combat a cabin fire effectively.
Edited to add: I might as well address all the points raised in that post here.
I said: “If they weren't in their suits, the plan was to use the water gun to put out the fire.”
Jarrah said: Ridiculous. There was a fire extinguisher stored inside Spacecraft 008 during it’s testing and it’s altitude tests were supposed to be typical of all spacecraft. Yet NASA pulled this fire extinguisher out before sealing the crew in.
Firstly, where does it mention the fire extinguishers? I haven't read about it as yet, but then again I haven't gone through every part of the reports as yet. The description of the differences between spacecraft 008 and spacecraft 012, given on page D-1-18, paragraph G, appendix D, panels 1 thru 4, fails to mention it though.
Next, the water gun was a Gemini procedure. It was decided "..after a report of considerable length and considerable detail...". (See page 81, Hearings before oversight subcommittee, evening session, 10 APR 67, testimony by COL Borman).
I said: “The option still existed for them to don the emergency masks and partially depress the cabin, helping put out the fire.”
Jarrah said: Define partially depress. I’ve already proven above that it takes as long as half an hour to depressurise the craft under normal procedures. And you think they could instantly depressurise it during an emergency?
You were totally wrong about the time. The maximum time was 3 minutes 20 seconds. A partial depress is reducing the cabin pressure to a sufficient pressure where combustion is not sustained. They thought - before the fire - that it would be effective in case of fire. They were wrong. That happens, you know.
I said: “Now what was the risk of a fire happening? There was some risk of an electrical short happening, but it was considered low”
Jarrah said: And yet John Young states that he knew the wiring was an extremely bad condition and that NASA would fire him (Grissom) if he complained about it. How can you claim they considered the risk low when Young now claims he knew it was a risk and NASA would take that approach to any who complained?
Yes, they knew there were problems. The CM arrived with a list of discrepancies... but they believed they would be fixed and they did not believe they posed an unacceptable risk.
If Gus Grissom thought there was an unacceptable risk of being killed, then why did he allow a test in that very same spacecraft pumped with 100% oxygen at in excess of 16 PSI?
BECAUSE HE DID NOT CONSIDER IT AN UNACCEPTABLE RISK - THE SAME AS ALL THE ASTRONAUTS.
I said: “Besides, design rules meant that there was not to be any flammable material within 12 inches of any possible ignition source.”
Jarrah said: And yet someone was allowed by NASA and NAA to plaster the entire bulkheads with such flammable material like Velcro. Grissom brought this fire risk to attention and NAA not only failed to remove the Velcro, they and Joe Shea both blamed Grissom for the amount of Velcro in there.
It's my impression that Shea warned them not to do so, that NASA procedures were more stringent, that NAA's procedures were less stringent, but in any case the limitation on velcro inside the spacecraft was not rigidly enforced. I think that was partially due to the astronauts (multiple) wanting it. Let me look into this one more extensively.
I said: “So the hazard was known, but the risk of an event with catastrophic consequences was low... or so it was believed. That's why the test was not considered to be hazardous. There were no fuels loaded, there were no explosives,”
Jarrah said: Yes there was. This was already discussed in my video. The fuels used on the Saturn IB were liquid hydrogen and liquid oxygen. Oxygen was obviously the same element used in the capsule cabin for breathing. And whether liquid or gaseous, if you put an ignition source in pure oxygen it will go up in flames. Yet they didn’t have the firemen on maximum alert, only standby.
Hospital employees know the dangers of gaseous oxygen. And on all the previous flights there were no-smoking signs stamped all over the launch site, hear NAA employees were allowed to use cigarette lighters to read the signs posted everywhere. Frank Borman was an Assistant Professor in Thermodynamics, and all Thermodynamics experts are familiar with Bomb Calorimeters – a chamber in which a food or water sample is ignited in pure oxygen.
You need to do some research. Oxygen, by itself, is not a problem. Combine it with an ignition source AND fuel, then you have problems.
How many people have you seen who have 100% oxygen cylinders on their wheelchairs? There are many, you know. Do you see restricted access areas around them? Where are the fire engines?
Let me try and explain this again to you:
It was recognized as a hazard; the RISK was underestimated.