Jarrah said: NASA public affairs officer Paul P. Haney announced on January 27 1967 that the fatal fire had been recorded on film and that this video material was handed over to a board of inquiry.
Mark Gray of Spacecraft Films denies the existence of any video of the Apollo 1 fire. Why does he deny the existence of such material, when NASA announced they had just that? Why is he suppressing that footage from public view?
This is a very good example of when something turns from hobby to passion to obsession. Jarrah has what can only be described as a hatred of Mark Gray, principal of Spacecraft Films.
Why do I say this? Let's have a look at what Jarrah has said.
Did Paul Haney announce on 27 Jan 67 that there was film footage? My records say it was on 28 Jan 67, but.. yes, he did.
Was the statement correct? No.
Why?
There was audio recording of all the communication channels, and there was live video from a camera pointed at the spacecraft hatch... but the video feed was not recorded.
A possible explanation for the NASA PAO's statement was because recordings (audio) of the events were being provided to the board, and statements were taken from all persons who saw the video feed.
During the confusion of the first couple of days, it is understandable that a mistake was made.
Now - does Jarrah accuse NASA of a coverup? No - he accuses Mr Gray! It's just another sign that Jarrah White does not seek what happened, but instead wants to accuse / prove wrong / hurt those whom he has disagreements with.
Not a scientific method.
30 August 2009
29 August 2009
Jarrah's Question No5
Jarrah said: NASA and the US government had various oxygen fires in the past at the Brooks Air Force Base and the Philadelphia air center between 1962 and 1964, which compelled them to compile a report pointing out the danger of pure oxygen environments. Another oxygen fire, this time in Washington DC, cost two men their lives in 1965.
During his testimony to Congress, Frank Borman admitted "We are very aware of the fires at Johnsville Navy Air Station and also at Brooks Air Force Base"
How could NASA not have considered the plugs out test hazardous when they knew about these past oxygen fires all along?
I don't know how many times this needs to be explained to you, but they were in error. It should have been considered hazardous but after using it for 6 years with manned spacecraft without incident, they became complacent. Let me summarise for you, Jarrah:
They were wrong - it should have been classified as hazardous.
They admitted they got it wrong.
They admitted they were terribly wrong.
They admitted that numerous areas of their operations needed to be at the minimum reviewed, but mostly completely overhauled.
It should never of happened - but it did. It wasn't deliberate, despite all the inuendo and aspersions you make.
During his testimony to Congress, Frank Borman admitted "We are very aware of the fires at Johnsville Navy Air Station and also at Brooks Air Force Base"
How could NASA not have considered the plugs out test hazardous when they knew about these past oxygen fires all along?
I don't know how many times this needs to be explained to you, but they were in error. It should have been considered hazardous but after using it for 6 years with manned spacecraft without incident, they became complacent. Let me summarise for you, Jarrah:
They were wrong - it should have been classified as hazardous.
They admitted they got it wrong.
They admitted they were terribly wrong.
They admitted that numerous areas of their operations needed to be at the minimum reviewed, but mostly completely overhauled.
It should never of happened - but it did. It wasn't deliberate, despite all the inuendo and aspersions you make.
28 August 2009
Some additional points for Jarrah
"CERTIFICATION TEST SPECIFICATION (CTS) SID 65-1210 recognised that ground operations would involve short duration, high pressure exposure. It specified 14.7 pounds per square inch absolute (psia) of 95% oxygen for four hours, and 21 psia with 14.7 psia partial pressure oxygen for two hours."
Source: Report of Apollo 204 Review Board, appendix D-2, page D-2-4, para 2.
**********
Spacecraft 011 - Countdown Demonstration Test - 75% O2 - 15.3 PSI - 6 hours duration
Spacecraft 011 - Launch Countdown - 75% O2 - 15.3 PSI - 6 hours duration
Spacecraft 012 - Mission run Plugs Out - 93% - 16 PSI - 2.2 hours duration
Spacecraft 012 - Alt Chamber Test 1 (unmanned) - 100% - 14.7 PSI - 1.2 hours duration
Spacecraft 012 - Alt Chamber Test 1 (unmanned) - 75% - 6.2 PSI - 28 hours duration
Spacecraft 012 - Alt Chamber Test 1 (manned) - 100% - 14.7 PSI - 1 hour duration
Spacecraft 012 - Alt Chamber Test 1 (manned) - 95% - 5.5 PSI - 11 hours duration
Spacecraft 012 - Alt Chamber Test 2 (unmanned) - 100% - 14.7 PSI - 1.5 hours duration
Spacecraft 012 - Alt Chamber Test 2 (unmanned) - 75% - 6.2 PSI - 6 hours duration
Spacecraft 012 - Alt Chamber Test 2 (manned) - 100% - 14.7 PSI - 1.5 hour duration
Spacecraft 012 - Alt Chamber Test 2 (manned) - 95% - 5.5 PSI - 11 hours duration
Source: Report of Apollo 204 Review Board, appendix D-2, page D-2-4, para 2.
**********
Spacecraft 011 - Countdown Demonstration Test - 75% O2 - 15.3 PSI - 6 hours duration
Spacecraft 011 - Launch Countdown - 75% O2 - 15.3 PSI - 6 hours duration
Spacecraft 012 - Mission run Plugs Out - 93% - 16 PSI - 2.2 hours duration
Spacecraft 012 - Alt Chamber Test 1 (unmanned) - 100% - 14.7 PSI - 1.2 hours duration
Spacecraft 012 - Alt Chamber Test 1 (unmanned) - 75% - 6.2 PSI - 28 hours duration
Spacecraft 012 - Alt Chamber Test 1 (manned) - 100% - 14.7 PSI - 1 hour duration
Spacecraft 012 - Alt Chamber Test 1 (manned) - 95% - 5.5 PSI - 11 hours duration
Spacecraft 012 - Alt Chamber Test 2 (unmanned) - 100% - 14.7 PSI - 1.5 hours duration
Spacecraft 012 - Alt Chamber Test 2 (unmanned) - 75% - 6.2 PSI - 6 hours duration
Spacecraft 012 - Alt Chamber Test 2 (manned) - 100% - 14.7 PSI - 1.5 hour duration
Spacecraft 012 - Alt Chamber Test 2 (manned) - 95% - 5.5 PSI - 11 hours duration
Interlude
Whilst people are reading this, please keep in mind an aviation precept which has been with us since not long after humans first took powered flight:
"Aviation in itself is not inherently dangerous, but to a degree even greater than the sea is terribly unforgiving of any carelessness, incapacity, or neglect."
Capt. A.G. Lamplaugh, British Aviation Insurance Corporation, circa 1930
"Aviation in itself is not inherently dangerous, but to a degree even greater than the sea is terribly unforgiving of any carelessness, incapacity, or neglect."
Capt. A.G. Lamplaugh, British Aviation Insurance Corporation, circa 1930
Jarrah's Question No4
Jarrah said:On page 38 of The History Of Manned Space Flight, Dr. David Baker tells us: On Earth, atmosphere consists of a 760mmHg mixture of 21% oxygen and 79% nitrogen, plus several trace gases that can be ignored for temporary and artificial environments. Because the quantity of oxygen in the lungs regulates the amount entering the blood, any appreciable increase in partial oxygen pressure of 160mmHg will cause irritation of mucous membranes and could disturb the function of critical enzymes.
However, even a moderate fall below the normal partial pressure value quickly causes brain damages and severe side-effects.
The option available to Mercury engineers were that the capsule could contain either a two-gas mixture of oxygen and nitrogen at sea-level pressure (760mmHg) or a single gas atmosphere of pure oxygen at about 160mmHg. Tests revealed that the pure oxygen pressure limits were between 150mmHg and 345mmHg.
Oxygen pressure for a single gas atmosphere outside these limits would cause severe, if not permanent, damage."
150mmHg = 2.9psi
345mmHg = 6.67psi
Depending on whether you ask Michael Collins, Gordon Cooper or Frank Borman; Apollo 1s cabin pressure was either nearly 16psi or 16.7psi or 20.2psi. Either way, these pressures are outside the safe pressure limits for breathing pure oxygen.
Why did NASA not classify Apollo 1 as hazardous, when they knew since Mercury that breathing pure oxygen at those pressures alone was a hazard?
The reports I have read list slightly different tolerance (Po2=425mmHg) but not enought to make a difference to what you are saying.
So: is breathing 100% oxygen at 16 psi or greater (or at a Po2 of 425 mmHG or greater) hazardous? Yes, if it is done for anything other than short periods... but the astronauts were all in their A1C pressure suits, breathing oxygen at around 2.5-3.5 psi. If there were an emergency whereby they had to remove the helmets, they pressure would have been dumped and the short exposure to 100% oxygen at elevated pressures would have had little - if any - effect on the affected crewmember.
Even so, we once again come to the question as to why this test was not classified as hazardous... and once again the answer is they got complacent and just didn't think it was that hazardous. None of the astronauts did.
However, even a moderate fall below the normal partial pressure value quickly causes brain damages and severe side-effects.
The option available to Mercury engineers were that the capsule could contain either a two-gas mixture of oxygen and nitrogen at sea-level pressure (760mmHg) or a single gas atmosphere of pure oxygen at about 160mmHg. Tests revealed that the pure oxygen pressure limits were between 150mmHg and 345mmHg.
Oxygen pressure for a single gas atmosphere outside these limits would cause severe, if not permanent, damage."
150mmHg = 2.9psi
345mmHg = 6.67psi
Depending on whether you ask Michael Collins, Gordon Cooper or Frank Borman; Apollo 1s cabin pressure was either nearly 16psi or 16.7psi or 20.2psi. Either way, these pressures are outside the safe pressure limits for breathing pure oxygen.
Why did NASA not classify Apollo 1 as hazardous, when they knew since Mercury that breathing pure oxygen at those pressures alone was a hazard?
The reports I have read list slightly different tolerance (Po2=425mmHg) but not enought to make a difference to what you are saying.
So: is breathing 100% oxygen at 16 psi or greater (or at a Po2 of 425 mmHG or greater) hazardous? Yes, if it is done for anything other than short periods... but the astronauts were all in their A1C pressure suits, breathing oxygen at around 2.5-3.5 psi. If there were an emergency whereby they had to remove the helmets, they pressure would have been dumped and the short exposure to 100% oxygen at elevated pressures would have had little - if any - effect on the affected crewmember.
Even so, we once again come to the question as to why this test was not classified as hazardous... and once again the answer is they got complacent and just didn't think it was that hazardous. None of the astronauts did.
25 August 2009
Jarrah's Question No3
Jarrah said: "On page 57 of Mission To The Moon, by Kennan & Harvey, we find: The Review Board therefore included the history of a similar spacecraft, command module 008, whose altitude testing was presumed to be typical of all Apollo spacecraft. It is of the greatest significance that two fire extinguishers were located in that (008) spacecraft during its testing.
Not only were fire extinguishers included, but fire-resistant Teflon sheets and fireproof Beta-cloth were draped over wire bundles and the astronauts couches. These particular items, nonflight items, were conspicuously absent in command module 012 during the fatal plugs-out test on January 27, 1967.
We are also told by John Young in various interviews, such as his interview for the documentary In The Shadow Of The Moon, that NASA would fire him (Grissom) if he spoke up about the shoddy wiring.
Why did NASA remove the fire extinguishers from the cockpit, strip the wires of their fireproofing, and would fire anyone who brought this wiring problem to attention?"
Okay, I can now read that there were fire extinguishers available in Spacecraft 008. Would this have made a difference? NO. Why? By the time the fire was noticed, it was already well established. In the atmosphere, a fire extinguisher would have been unlikely to be able to stop the flame propagation. Additionally, any fire extinguisher except for water or foam would have produced toxic gases in the enclosed space.
What does the report say were the materials that were non-flight items or possibly relevant to flame propagation?
All sorts of things would have made a difference. 20/20 hindsight is a wonderful thing, but NOTHING indicates anything like deliberate efforts to kills the crew. Were NASA and NAA culpable? In hindsight, yes. Do NASA or NAA deny this? No.
Lastly, there is the claim that Grissom said he would be sacked if he complained about the spacecraft. Is this true? If John Young said it is true, then I believe it. yet once again, does anyone believe that Gus Grissom - or any of the crew - would have placed themselves in a position where they thought it was likely they would have been killed.
NO.
They were test pilots, used to risk... but would not take unacceptable risks. This has been stated on a number of occasions. As Frank Borman said: "Although there are sometimes romantic and silk-scarf attitudes attributed to this type of business, in the final analysis we are professionals and will accept risks but not undue risks."
Not only were fire extinguishers included, but fire-resistant Teflon sheets and fireproof Beta-cloth were draped over wire bundles and the astronauts couches. These particular items, nonflight items, were conspicuously absent in command module 012 during the fatal plugs-out test on January 27, 1967.
We are also told by John Young in various interviews, such as his interview for the documentary In The Shadow Of The Moon, that NASA would fire him (Grissom) if he spoke up about the shoddy wiring.
Why did NASA remove the fire extinguishers from the cockpit, strip the wires of their fireproofing, and would fire anyone who brought this wiring problem to attention?"
Okay, I can now read that there were fire extinguishers available in Spacecraft 008. Would this have made a difference? NO. Why? By the time the fire was noticed, it was already well established. In the atmosphere, a fire extinguisher would have been unlikely to be able to stop the flame propagation. Additionally, any fire extinguisher except for water or foam would have produced toxic gases in the enclosed space.
What does the report say were the materials that were non-flight items or possibly relevant to flame propagation?
- Inspection of polyurethane foam and coating with silicone rubber of some items not carried out.
- Polyurethane bags placed over hose fittings for drinking water dispenser / battery instrumentation cable / connectors / transducer.
- Two polyurethane pads over couch struts in spacecraft to protect wiring during planned egress drill.
- Three packages of checklists for spacecraft checkout.
- Nylon protective sleeves placed over crew umbilical cords.
- Nylon window covers.
- Velcro hook to protect velcro pile spacecraft floor.
- 'Remove Before Flight' tags.
- Polyurethane protective covers over hand controller cables.
- Did not have Teflon protective covers on wiring.
- Additional wiring for altitude tests.
- Had inferior cabin lighting.
- Did not have noise filters on communication cables.
- Beta-cloth covering used extensively on aft bulkhead.
All sorts of things would have made a difference. 20/20 hindsight is a wonderful thing, but NOTHING indicates anything like deliberate efforts to kills the crew. Were NASA and NAA culpable? In hindsight, yes. Do NASA or NAA deny this? No.
Lastly, there is the claim that Grissom said he would be sacked if he complained about the spacecraft. Is this true? If John Young said it is true, then I believe it. yet once again, does anyone believe that Gus Grissom - or any of the crew - would have placed themselves in a position where they thought it was likely they would have been killed.
NO.
They were test pilots, used to risk... but would not take unacceptable risks. This has been stated on a number of occasions. As Frank Borman said: "Although there are sometimes romantic and silk-scarf attitudes attributed to this type of business, in the final analysis we are professionals and will accept risks but not undue risks."
24 August 2009
A response to a comment
I said: ‘100% oxygen posed an unacceptable risk. NO - you have to look deeper. If a fire had occurred in space and the astronauts were in their suits, the immediate action would have been to depressurize the cabin. Remove the oxygen and they fire goes out.’
Jarrah said in the comments section: Already debunked in my video. It takes as long as half an hour to depressurise the Lunar Module, depressurising the CSM will obviously take longer. That hardly justifies the fire hazard.
I'll post this one here rather than response in the comments section, as it is an important point.
You're wrong, Jarrah, but in one respect you are right. The time taken is far less than that, but it wouldn't have been enough to save them. Prior to the accident, that was the plan - dump the cabin pressure, remove the oxygen and therefore put out the fire. As part of the fire investigation, they studied the effect of a cabin pressure dump. They found a few things:
1. If the Apollo 1 crew had dumped the cabin pressure, it would not have saved them. It would have delayed the pressure hull rupture by a second or two.
2. The time to dump the cabin pressure from about 5 PSI to 0.5 PSI could take from 1 minute 45 seconds to 3 minutes 20 seconds, depending upon the flight phase ambient temperature. NOT in excess of 30 minutes as Jarrah mistaken believes. (Page D-20-9, Report of the Apollo 204 Review Board)
3. The depressurization time was too slow to combat a cabin fire effectively.
Edited to add: I might as well address all the points raised in that post here.
*******************
I said: “If they weren't in their suits, the plan was to use the water gun to put out the fire.”
Jarrah said: Ridiculous. There was a fire extinguisher stored inside Spacecraft 008 during it’s testing and it’s altitude tests were supposed to be typical of all spacecraft. Yet NASA pulled this fire extinguisher out before sealing the crew in.
Firstly, where does it mention the fire extinguishers? I haven't read about it as yet, but then again I haven't gone through every part of the reports as yet. The description of the differences between spacecraft 008 and spacecraft 012, given on page D-1-18, paragraph G, appendix D, panels 1 thru 4, fails to mention it though.
Next, the water gun was a Gemini procedure. It was decided "..after a report of considerable length and considerable detail...". (See page 81, Hearings before oversight subcommittee, evening session, 10 APR 67, testimony by COL Borman).
******************
I said: “The option still existed for them to don the emergency masks and partially depress the cabin, helping put out the fire.”
Jarrah said: Define partially depress. I’ve already proven above that it takes as long as half an hour to depressurise the craft under normal procedures. And you think they could instantly depressurise it during an emergency?
You were totally wrong about the time. The maximum time was 3 minutes 20 seconds. A partial depress is reducing the cabin pressure to a sufficient pressure where combustion is not sustained. They thought - before the fire - that it would be effective in case of fire. They were wrong. That happens, you know.
*************
I said: “Now what was the risk of a fire happening? There was some risk of an electrical short happening, but it was considered low”
Jarrah said: And yet John Young states that he knew the wiring was an extremely bad condition and that NASA would fire him (Grissom) if he complained about it. How can you claim they considered the risk low when Young now claims he knew it was a risk and NASA would take that approach to any who complained?
Yes, they knew there were problems. The CM arrived with a list of discrepancies... but they believed they would be fixed and they did not believe they posed an unacceptable risk.
If Gus Grissom thought there was an unacceptable risk of being killed, then why did he allow a test in that very same spacecraft pumped with 100% oxygen at in excess of 16 PSI?
BECAUSE HE DID NOT CONSIDER IT AN UNACCEPTABLE RISK - THE SAME AS ALL THE ASTRONAUTS.
**********************
I said: “Besides, design rules meant that there was not to be any flammable material within 12 inches of any possible ignition source.”
Jarrah said: And yet someone was allowed by NASA and NAA to plaster the entire bulkheads with such flammable material like Velcro. Grissom brought this fire risk to attention and NAA not only failed to remove the Velcro, they and Joe Shea both blamed Grissom for the amount of Velcro in there.
It's my impression that Shea warned them not to do so, that NASA procedures were more stringent, that NAA's procedures were less stringent, but in any case the limitation on velcro inside the spacecraft was not rigidly enforced. I think that was partially due to the astronauts (multiple) wanting it. Let me look into this one more extensively.
*******************
I said: “So the hazard was known, but the risk of an event with catastrophic consequences was low... or so it was believed. That's why the test was not considered to be hazardous. There were no fuels loaded, there were no explosives,”
Jarrah said: Yes there was. This was already discussed in my video. The fuels used on the Saturn IB were liquid hydrogen and liquid oxygen. Oxygen was obviously the same element used in the capsule cabin for breathing. And whether liquid or gaseous, if you put an ignition source in pure oxygen it will go up in flames. Yet they didn’t have the firemen on maximum alert, only standby.
Hospital employees know the dangers of gaseous oxygen. And on all the previous flights there were no-smoking signs stamped all over the launch site, hear NAA employees were allowed to use cigarette lighters to read the signs posted everywhere. Frank Borman was an Assistant Professor in Thermodynamics, and all Thermodynamics experts are familiar with Bomb Calorimeters – a chamber in which a food or water sample is ignited in pure oxygen.
You need to do some research. Oxygen, by itself, is not a problem. Combine it with an ignition source AND fuel, then you have problems.
How many people have you seen who have 100% oxygen cylinders on their wheelchairs? There are many, you know. Do you see restricted access areas around them? Where are the fire engines?
Let me try and explain this again to you:
It was recognized as a hazard; the RISK was underestimated.
Jarrah said in the comments section: Already debunked in my video. It takes as long as half an hour to depressurise the Lunar Module, depressurising the CSM will obviously take longer. That hardly justifies the fire hazard.
I'll post this one here rather than response in the comments section, as it is an important point.
You're wrong, Jarrah, but in one respect you are right. The time taken is far less than that, but it wouldn't have been enough to save them. Prior to the accident, that was the plan - dump the cabin pressure, remove the oxygen and therefore put out the fire. As part of the fire investigation, they studied the effect of a cabin pressure dump. They found a few things:
1. If the Apollo 1 crew had dumped the cabin pressure, it would not have saved them. It would have delayed the pressure hull rupture by a second or two.
2. The time to dump the cabin pressure from about 5 PSI to 0.5 PSI could take from 1 minute 45 seconds to 3 minutes 20 seconds, depending upon the flight phase ambient temperature. NOT in excess of 30 minutes as Jarrah mistaken believes. (Page D-20-9, Report of the Apollo 204 Review Board)
3. The depressurization time was too slow to combat a cabin fire effectively.
Edited to add: I might as well address all the points raised in that post here.
*******************
I said: “If they weren't in their suits, the plan was to use the water gun to put out the fire.”
Jarrah said: Ridiculous. There was a fire extinguisher stored inside Spacecraft 008 during it’s testing and it’s altitude tests were supposed to be typical of all spacecraft. Yet NASA pulled this fire extinguisher out before sealing the crew in.
Firstly, where does it mention the fire extinguishers? I haven't read about it as yet, but then again I haven't gone through every part of the reports as yet. The description of the differences between spacecraft 008 and spacecraft 012, given on page D-1-18, paragraph G, appendix D, panels 1 thru 4, fails to mention it though.
Next, the water gun was a Gemini procedure. It was decided "..after a report of considerable length and considerable detail...". (See page 81, Hearings before oversight subcommittee, evening session, 10 APR 67, testimony by COL Borman).
******************
I said: “The option still existed for them to don the emergency masks and partially depress the cabin, helping put out the fire.”
Jarrah said: Define partially depress. I’ve already proven above that it takes as long as half an hour to depressurise the craft under normal procedures. And you think they could instantly depressurise it during an emergency?
You were totally wrong about the time. The maximum time was 3 minutes 20 seconds. A partial depress is reducing the cabin pressure to a sufficient pressure where combustion is not sustained. They thought - before the fire - that it would be effective in case of fire. They were wrong. That happens, you know.
*************
I said: “Now what was the risk of a fire happening? There was some risk of an electrical short happening, but it was considered low”
Jarrah said: And yet John Young states that he knew the wiring was an extremely bad condition and that NASA would fire him (Grissom) if he complained about it. How can you claim they considered the risk low when Young now claims he knew it was a risk and NASA would take that approach to any who complained?
Yes, they knew there were problems. The CM arrived with a list of discrepancies... but they believed they would be fixed and they did not believe they posed an unacceptable risk.
If Gus Grissom thought there was an unacceptable risk of being killed, then why did he allow a test in that very same spacecraft pumped with 100% oxygen at in excess of 16 PSI?
BECAUSE HE DID NOT CONSIDER IT AN UNACCEPTABLE RISK - THE SAME AS ALL THE ASTRONAUTS.
**********************
I said: “Besides, design rules meant that there was not to be any flammable material within 12 inches of any possible ignition source.”
Jarrah said: And yet someone was allowed by NASA and NAA to plaster the entire bulkheads with such flammable material like Velcro. Grissom brought this fire risk to attention and NAA not only failed to remove the Velcro, they and Joe Shea both blamed Grissom for the amount of Velcro in there.
It's my impression that Shea warned them not to do so, that NASA procedures were more stringent, that NAA's procedures were less stringent, but in any case the limitation on velcro inside the spacecraft was not rigidly enforced. I think that was partially due to the astronauts (multiple) wanting it. Let me look into this one more extensively.
*******************
I said: “So the hazard was known, but the risk of an event with catastrophic consequences was low... or so it was believed. That's why the test was not considered to be hazardous. There were no fuels loaded, there were no explosives,”
Jarrah said: Yes there was. This was already discussed in my video. The fuels used on the Saturn IB were liquid hydrogen and liquid oxygen. Oxygen was obviously the same element used in the capsule cabin for breathing. And whether liquid or gaseous, if you put an ignition source in pure oxygen it will go up in flames. Yet they didn’t have the firemen on maximum alert, only standby.
Hospital employees know the dangers of gaseous oxygen. And on all the previous flights there were no-smoking signs stamped all over the launch site, hear NAA employees were allowed to use cigarette lighters to read the signs posted everywhere. Frank Borman was an Assistant Professor in Thermodynamics, and all Thermodynamics experts are familiar with Bomb Calorimeters – a chamber in which a food or water sample is ignited in pure oxygen.
You need to do some research. Oxygen, by itself, is not a problem. Combine it with an ignition source AND fuel, then you have problems.
How many people have you seen who have 100% oxygen cylinders on their wheelchairs? There are many, you know. Do you see restricted access areas around them? Where are the fire engines?
Let me try and explain this again to you:
It was recognized as a hazard; the RISK was underestimated.
23 August 2009
Interlude
Please note: I will not tolerate rude or abusive language in the comments; I'll delete them. The only person who will be exempt from this will be Jarrah White. I do not want to be accused of censoring any of his comments.
Jarrah's Question No2
Jarrah says: On pages 224 and 225 of Harrison Storms autobiography, Angle of Attack, Michael Gray writes: "After the hatch was sealed, the cockpit cabin was pressurized with pure oxygen, as it would be on the way to the moon. Since the spacecraft was designed to contain pressure in the vacuum of space not resist it from the outside and since the sea-level pressure would be somewhere around 14.7 pounds per square inch, the cabin was pressurized to 16 pounds per square inch.
Unfortunately, this fact was simply the end result of a string of logical decisions, and not something that anyone had planned for. The engineering specifications speak only of a five-pound oxygen environment, and neither Storms nor Charlie Feltz nor anyone else in top management had any idea that there were three men sitting inside the command module surrounded by pure oxygen at sixteen pounds per square inch?
If Toby Freedman had discovered it, he would have grabbed the phone and screamed at them to hold everything. Toby was a doctor, and every doctor knows of hospital stories involving oxygen fires. True, Toby had signed off on the idea of pure oxygen in the command module, but only at NASA's insistence and then he was under the impression that they were talking about oxygen at five pounds per square inch.
At five pounds the pressure inside the command module in orbit a lighted cigarette would merely burn rapidly; at sixteen pounds, the cigarette would vanish in a flash along with all your hair and your clothes as well."
Yet in the July-August 1964 Journal of Spacecraft and Rockets, NAA's Dr. Frank J. Hendel put in an article in which he says this about pure oxygen: "it presents a fire hazard, which is especially great on the launching pad, when the cabin is purged with oxygen at 14.7psia"
Why does NAA claim they thought NASA was doing the test at only 5psi, when as early as 1964 one of their own engineers stated that he knew its done at sea level pressure?
For a start, we are talking about a quote from a biography written by one person. It gives the impression that Harrison Storms did not know about the test. Is this correct, or is it a mistake by the biographer?
The second quote seems to indicate NAA knew about a raised pressure test. So what is correct?
When a spacecraft is received from the contractor, in this case North American Aviation (NAA), it undergoes a number of tests to ensure that the product delivered meets the contracted specifications. Command Module 012 was no different:
So yes, NAA knew about the test conditions. The biographer has made an error.
Unfortunately, this fact was simply the end result of a string of logical decisions, and not something that anyone had planned for. The engineering specifications speak only of a five-pound oxygen environment, and neither Storms nor Charlie Feltz nor anyone else in top management had any idea that there were three men sitting inside the command module surrounded by pure oxygen at sixteen pounds per square inch?
If Toby Freedman had discovered it, he would have grabbed the phone and screamed at them to hold everything. Toby was a doctor, and every doctor knows of hospital stories involving oxygen fires. True, Toby had signed off on the idea of pure oxygen in the command module, but only at NASA's insistence and then he was under the impression that they were talking about oxygen at five pounds per square inch.
At five pounds the pressure inside the command module in orbit a lighted cigarette would merely burn rapidly; at sixteen pounds, the cigarette would vanish in a flash along with all your hair and your clothes as well."
Yet in the July-August 1964 Journal of Spacecraft and Rockets, NAA's Dr. Frank J. Hendel put in an article in which he says this about pure oxygen: "it presents a fire hazard, which is especially great on the launching pad, when the cabin is purged with oxygen at 14.7psia"
Why does NAA claim they thought NASA was doing the test at only 5psi, when as early as 1964 one of their own engineers stated that he knew its done at sea level pressure?
For a start, we are talking about a quote from a biography written by one person. It gives the impression that Harrison Storms did not know about the test. Is this correct, or is it a mistake by the biographer?
The second quote seems to indicate NAA knew about a raised pressure test. So what is correct?
When a spacecraft is received from the contractor, in this case North American Aviation (NAA), it undergoes a number of tests to ensure that the product delivered meets the contracted specifications. Command Module 012 was no different:
- 26 AUG 66 - CM012 received at KSC and mated with service module for certification checks.
- 10-11 OCT 66 - CM012 undergoes unmanned acceptance tests in air at sea-level pressure. Test discontinued to replace bent umbilical pins.
- 12-13 OCT 66 - Unmanned test continues.
- 14-15 OCT 66 - Unmanned test using 100% oxygen and at flight altitude pressures (16.7 PSI or greater).
- 18 OCT 66 - Manned test (with Grissom / White / Chaffee) using 100% oxygen and at flight altitude pressure. Test discontinued after reaching simulated altitude of 13,000 feet due transistor failure in an inverter.
- 19 OCT 66 - Inverter replaced and manned test continued.
- 21 OCT 66 - Manned test (with backup crew) using 100% oxygen and at flight altitude pressure. Test discontinued due failure in oxygen system regulator in the Environmental Control Unit (ECU). The regulator was removed and discovered to have a design deficiency.
- 27 OCT 66 - The ECU was returned to NAA for rectification.
- 14 DEC 66 - ECU returned for testing but developed further leaks in the water / glycol circuit. Returned to NAA. Finally returned 14 DEC.
- 27-28 DEC 66 - Unmanned sea-level and altitude pressure tests conducted.
- 29-30 DEC 66 - Manned tests (with backup crew) using 100% oxygen and at flight altitude pressure.
So yes, NAA knew about the test conditions. The biographer has made an error.
Jarrah's Question No1
Jarrah asked: During his testimony, Frank Borman told Congress: "I dont believe that any of us recognized that the test conditions for this test were hazardous." He also told the US Senate: "None of us were fully aware of the hazard that existed when you combine a pure-oxygen atmosphere with the extensive distribution? of combustibles and the likely ignition...and so this test...was not classified as hazardous."
Yet in his on pages 162 and 163 of his book, Men From Earth, Buzz Aldrin writes: "The only serious hazard of the pure-oxygen environment was fire. As every high school student learns, when a smoldering match is put into a beaker of oxygen, it blazes into a spectacular flame. The Apollo cabin was also an oxygen-rich container, and the spacecrafts many switches, electrical equipment, and over 15 miles of wiring could easily short-circuit, providing a glowing match".
They either didn't know the risk, as Borman stated. Or they knew the risk and considered it acceptable, as Aldrin says. Which is it?
This is where we see an example of the incorrect interpretation Jarrah often makes. We have to look at three parts: what was the hazard, what risk was associated with the hazard, and what are the consequences.
Firstly what was the hazard? The hazard was the use of 100% oxygen in the spacecraft.
What was the risk? The risk was fire in the spacecraft.
Now, and most importantly, what are the consequences? The consequence depended on the phase of flight, and ranged from loss of cabin pressure and possible mission abort, to loss of the crew .
Well, that's obvious, isn't it? 100% oxygen posed an unacceptable risk. NO - you have to look deeper. If a fire had occurred in space and the astronauts were in their suits, the immediate action would have been to depressurize the cabin. Remove the oxygen and they fire goes out. If they weren't in their suits, the plan was to use the water gun to put out the fire. The option still existed for them to don the emergency masks and partially depress the cabin, helping put out the fire. They would have had to abort the mission, but the crew would have a high probability of survival.
This was the case through the majority of the flight. It would not be available if there were a fire on the pad. The length of time on the pad, however, was small compared to the total mission time.
Now what was the risk of a fire happening? There was some risk of an electrical short happening, but it was considered low; after all, this was a US spacecraft not some cheap radio from Japan. Besides, design rules meant that there was not to be any flammable material within 12 inches of any possible ignition source.
So the hazard was known, but the risk of an event with catastrophic consequences was low... or so it was believed. That's why the test was not considered to be hazardous. There were no fuels loaded, there were no explosives, even the launch escape system rocket was safed.
So what changed this? There were a number of factors, the most importantly being the spacecraft the spacecraft being pressurized to nearly 20 psi. This drastically increased the the consequences of any fire; it would burn with greater intensity. What also was not properly considered was the increased risk of an electrical short because of faulty wiring, poor workmanship.
NASA knew there were problems; so did the astronauts. It was just they believed that the problems would be solved. No aircraft, no complex technical system ever develops trouble-free; there are always faults, always problems.
NASA - and the astronauts - got lulled into a false sense of security.
They had used 100% oxygen in Mercury and Gemini without problems. The Apollo spacecraft, pressurized with near 20 psi of 100% oxygen, had been tested four times previously in a test chamber with no problems. They just didn't completely consider everything, and got caught out.
Page 87 of Volume I to the INVESTIGATION INTO APOLLO 204 ACCIDENT before the US House of Representatives subcommittee on NASA oversight illustrates this:
Mr Gurney: Colonel, we all recognize, I think I state this correctly, that the use of pure oxygen does present, severe fire hazards. I think actually that is the language used in the report and I guess there has been a great deal of discussion between using pure oxygen or some other combination in the cabins of spacecraft and yet it puzzles me when you say that under these specific test conditions you never considered fire as a hazard. Now, what generally do you consider as a fire hazard in this kind of atmosphere? Then let me say in trying to illustrate, if you were going into a filling station to have car serviced you wouldn’t light a match and have a cigarette while the gas was going into the tank. What areas do you identify as rather severe risks in this business of working in a pure oxygen atmosphere?
Colonel Borman: I think what you say about going into the gas station and striking a match is true. Mr. Rumsfeld can tell you when he flew in the Navy in jets he was using 100% oxygen all the time. There is oxygen right above your head when striking matches on a commercial airliner. Oxygen per se is not dangerous, only when associated with a fuel and an ignition source. Quite frankly we did not think, and this is a failing on my part, and on everyone associated with us; we did not recognize the fact that we had the three essentials, an ignition source, extensive fuel, and of course we knew we had the oxygen.
Why didn't they realise the danger? Part of the reason was because fire propagation data was misleading:
Dr Thompson: Could I interject a comment? Prior to the accident review, a great deal of dependence had been placed on information for flame propagation obtained from small laboratory samples of burning rates, some burning horizontal and some vertical, some burning upward and some burning downward, and some at 45 degree angles, and all kind of results were obtained. One of the outstanding accomplishments of this review has been the development of a procedure for obtaining valid information on the flame-propagation problem. The results obtained from these small samples are shown to possibly downright misleading...
.
.
.
Mr Davis: Thank you, Sir. There is one other question and that is this: The decision to raise the capsule atmosphere to 16.7 pounds per square inch was entirely predicated upon the assumption that you could rely upon the fact that there would be no arcing within the capsule. That is correct, is it not? And if that assumption had not been wrong, then nothing else would have been the matter?
Dr Thompson: Yes.
Mr Davis: The fact that the assumption was wrong is the whole trouble?
Dr Thompson: That is correct.
So Jarrah - they knew about the hazards but the risks were not properly appreciated.
Yet in his on pages 162 and 163 of his book, Men From Earth, Buzz Aldrin writes: "The only serious hazard of the pure-oxygen environment was fire. As every high school student learns, when a smoldering match is put into a beaker of oxygen, it blazes into a spectacular flame. The Apollo cabin was also an oxygen-rich container, and the spacecrafts many switches, electrical equipment, and over 15 miles of wiring could easily short-circuit, providing a glowing match".
They either didn't know the risk, as Borman stated. Or they knew the risk and considered it acceptable, as Aldrin says. Which is it?
This is where we see an example of the incorrect interpretation Jarrah often makes. We have to look at three parts: what was the hazard, what risk was associated with the hazard, and what are the consequences.
Firstly what was the hazard? The hazard was the use of 100% oxygen in the spacecraft.
What was the risk? The risk was fire in the spacecraft.
Now, and most importantly, what are the consequences? The consequence depended on the phase of flight, and ranged from loss of cabin pressure and possible mission abort, to loss of the crew .
Well, that's obvious, isn't it? 100% oxygen posed an unacceptable risk. NO - you have to look deeper. If a fire had occurred in space and the astronauts were in their suits, the immediate action would have been to depressurize the cabin. Remove the oxygen and they fire goes out. If they weren't in their suits, the plan was to use the water gun to put out the fire. The option still existed for them to don the emergency masks and partially depress the cabin, helping put out the fire. They would have had to abort the mission, but the crew would have a high probability of survival.
This was the case through the majority of the flight. It would not be available if there were a fire on the pad. The length of time on the pad, however, was small compared to the total mission time.
Now what was the risk of a fire happening? There was some risk of an electrical short happening, but it was considered low; after all, this was a US spacecraft not some cheap radio from Japan. Besides, design rules meant that there was not to be any flammable material within 12 inches of any possible ignition source.
So the hazard was known, but the risk of an event with catastrophic consequences was low... or so it was believed. That's why the test was not considered to be hazardous. There were no fuels loaded, there were no explosives, even the launch escape system rocket was safed.
So what changed this? There were a number of factors, the most importantly being the spacecraft the spacecraft being pressurized to nearly 20 psi. This drastically increased the the consequences of any fire; it would burn with greater intensity. What also was not properly considered was the increased risk of an electrical short because of faulty wiring, poor workmanship.
NASA knew there were problems; so did the astronauts. It was just they believed that the problems would be solved. No aircraft, no complex technical system ever develops trouble-free; there are always faults, always problems.
NASA - and the astronauts - got lulled into a false sense of security.
They had used 100% oxygen in Mercury and Gemini without problems. The Apollo spacecraft, pressurized with near 20 psi of 100% oxygen, had been tested four times previously in a test chamber with no problems. They just didn't completely consider everything, and got caught out.
Page 87 of Volume I to the INVESTIGATION INTO APOLLO 204 ACCIDENT before the US House of Representatives subcommittee on NASA oversight illustrates this:
Mr Gurney: Colonel, we all recognize, I think I state this correctly, that the use of pure oxygen does present, severe fire hazards. I think actually that is the language used in the report and I guess there has been a great deal of discussion between using pure oxygen or some other combination in the cabins of spacecraft and yet it puzzles me when you say that under these specific test conditions you never considered fire as a hazard. Now, what generally do you consider as a fire hazard in this kind of atmosphere? Then let me say in trying to illustrate, if you were going into a filling station to have car serviced you wouldn’t light a match and have a cigarette while the gas was going into the tank. What areas do you identify as rather severe risks in this business of working in a pure oxygen atmosphere?
Colonel Borman: I think what you say about going into the gas station and striking a match is true. Mr. Rumsfeld can tell you when he flew in the Navy in jets he was using 100% oxygen all the time. There is oxygen right above your head when striking matches on a commercial airliner. Oxygen per se is not dangerous, only when associated with a fuel and an ignition source. Quite frankly we did not think, and this is a failing on my part, and on everyone associated with us; we did not recognize the fact that we had the three essentials, an ignition source, extensive fuel, and of course we knew we had the oxygen.
Why didn't they realise the danger? Part of the reason was because fire propagation data was misleading:
Dr Thompson: Could I interject a comment? Prior to the accident review, a great deal of dependence had been placed on information for flame propagation obtained from small laboratory samples of burning rates, some burning horizontal and some vertical, some burning upward and some burning downward, and some at 45 degree angles, and all kind of results were obtained. One of the outstanding accomplishments of this review has been the development of a procedure for obtaining valid information on the flame-propagation problem. The results obtained from these small samples are shown to possibly downright misleading...
.
.
.
Mr Davis: Thank you, Sir. There is one other question and that is this: The decision to raise the capsule atmosphere to 16.7 pounds per square inch was entirely predicated upon the assumption that you could rely upon the fact that there would be no arcing within the capsule. That is correct, is it not? And if that assumption had not been wrong, then nothing else would have been the matter?
Dr Thompson: Yes.
Mr Davis: The fact that the assumption was wrong is the whole trouble?
Dr Thompson: That is correct.
So Jarrah - they knew about the hazards but the risks were not properly appreciated.
What is this all about?
An Australian named Jarrah White believes the Apollo moon landings were faked. He makes little YouTube videos trying to support this belief. He's formed these beliefs because he is a layman and has made incorrect assumptions in certain areas, has incorrectly interpreted complex data and follows an incorrect scientific method: he starts with a conclusion and looks for evidence to support it, rather than examining all the evidence and then letting it lead to a conclusion.
One of his latest videos proposes that the Apollo 1 fire, which occurred 27 JAN 67 and killed astronauts Grissom, White and Chaffee on the launchpad, was a deliberate act by NASA. In other words, NASA murdered the astronauts.
He has posted a number of claims / questions regarding this tragic event, but replying on that page I am limited to 500 characters and can only reply (post) about 3 times per day.
This is NOT Jarrah's restriction; it is a restriction by YouTube.
Therefore I have created this blog to respond to his claims, where it is possible to properly quote documents, provide links to external sources, show images, etc.
Sooo, this blog is really just directed at Jarrah White. But you can read it to, if you like!
One of his latest videos proposes that the Apollo 1 fire, which occurred 27 JAN 67 and killed astronauts Grissom, White and Chaffee on the launchpad, was a deliberate act by NASA. In other words, NASA murdered the astronauts.
He has posted a number of claims / questions regarding this tragic event, but replying on that page I am limited to 500 characters and can only reply (post) about 3 times per day.
This is NOT Jarrah's restriction; it is a restriction by YouTube.
Therefore I have created this blog to respond to his claims, where it is possible to properly quote documents, provide links to external sources, show images, etc.
Sooo, this blog is really just directed at Jarrah White. But you can read it to, if you like!
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